Opinion: In Tigray, the Gulf powers are playing chess while civilians pay the price
The UAE's loud backing of Addis Ababa and Saudi Arabia's studied silence are not peacemaking but positioning. Judge the Gulf powers by outcomes in Tigray, not communiques.
There is a particular kind of press release that should make any reader of Horn of Africa news reach for their skepticism. It begins with expressions of solidarity, reaffirms sovereignty and territorial integrity, calls for de-escalation and dialogue, and ends precisely where the suffering begins: with nothing changing on the ground.
The United Arab Emirates issued exactly such a statement on September 25, condemning Tigrayan attacks and declaring solidarity with Ethiopia's federal government. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has said almost nothing at all about the renewed fighting, despite its much-vaunted history of regional mediation. Between Abu Dhabi's loud alignment and Riyadh's studied silence lies the real story of the Gulf in the Horn of Africa: not peacemaking, but positioning.
Make no mistake about what is being positioned. The UAE's interest in Ethiopia runs through the port of Berbera in Somaliland, operated by Dubai Ports World, and the shipping corridor opened in 2025 linking it to Jebel Ali. Landlocked Ethiopia is desperate for sea access; whoever controls the corridors controls leverage. Abu Dhabi's solidarity with Addis Ababa is the solidarity of a landlord with a tenant who pays on time.
Saudi Arabia's game is subtler but no less self-interested. Riyadh once brokered the Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement and reportedly offered to mediate again in 2025, yet its efforts collapsed, analysts say, because they never addressed Ethiopia's fixation on the Eritrean port of Assab. The kingdom cares about the Red Sea because its oil sails through it, not because Tigrayan civilians are dying. Its silence now is the silence of a power waiting to see which way the wind blows before spending any diplomatic capital.
And then there is Egypt, hovering at the edge of the frame, nursing its grievance over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and deepening its embrace of Eritrea. When Ethiopia's army chief accuses Cairo and Khartoum of arming the TPLF, and Egypt's foreign ministry answers with boilerplate about sovereignty and non-interference, what you are watching is not diplomacy. It is three regional powers using other people's wars as instruments of their own rivalries.
The cruelest irony is that all of this external maneuvering is conducted in the language of peace. Sovereignty, de-escalation, dialogue, the Pretoria Agreement: the vocabulary is impeccable and the outcomes are nil. The November 2022 Pretoria deal ended the last round of slaughter; its unravelling now is happening while every outside power with leverage issues statements instead of using it.
Here is the test the original analysis proposes, and it is the right one: judge these powers not by their communiques but by their outcomes. Has the UAE used its considerable relationship with Addis Ababa to restrain the federal government's military response? Has Saudi Arabia put its Red Sea influence behind an actual ceasefire? Has Egypt done anything besides accumulate grievances? On the evidence available, the answers are no, no, and no.
The people of Tigray, Afar and Amhara do not need another round of Gulf solidarity statements. They need the guns to stop. Until the external powers treat that as the objective rather than the talking point, their role in the Horn will remain what it has always been: spectators with interests, applauding their own reflection in someone else's tragedy.